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1 ABSTRACT
Presented herein is a system for Quantum Key Distribution Service (QKDServ) architecture that
utilizes the novel concept of "Quantum Key on demand" (QKoD) to achieve efficient key resource
usage in combination with a new concept of quantum key management server (QKMS) technique,
where efficient QKoD relies on the QKMS to allocate secret keys for security requirements in a timely
manner on demand. This proposed system also provides a novel QKD over SDN architecture where
QKMSs are constructed to secure control channels (C‐Ch) and data channels (D‐Ch). Finally, the
techniques presented herein propose a novel dynamic routing, wavelength and key assignment
(QRKWa) algorithm designed to implement QKoD jointly for C‐Chs and D‐Chs, where the adaptive
key assignment strategy considers two cases (i.e., key‐updating based on time complexity of attacks
and key‐updating based on data complexity of attacks).

2 TECHNICAL FIELD
The following relates generally to Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) and more specifically to
architecture for QKD management and routing distribution.

3 BACKGROUND
The main cryptographic protocols used today to secure the Internet and the vital services
accessed across the Internet, such financial transactions, are all susceptible to attack by the
development of a sufficiently large and efficient quantum computer.
In case of classical computation, the complexity of searching in an unstructured data set of size
is
, e.g., in the worst possible case, all the records will need to be inspected. The well‐known
Grover’s algorithm allows to solve this problem in √ , steps. This essentially means that, if we
have 40 bits and we need to find a combination that satisfies certain condition, then in the classical
case we need to process approximately 10 different combinations, whereas the quantum
algorithm will yield a result in about 10 queries.
Rather than depending on the complexity of factoring large numbers, quantum cryptography is
based on the fundamental and unchanging principles of quantum mechanics, which in turn the
efficient Shor's algorithm is based. The following proposal is for replacing the current day public key
cryptography with a variety of quantum algorithm.
Several industry leaders and financial institutions have started testing quantum computing as
an option for their future production network. This proposed architecture is that of an
implementation of QKD as an integrated service in SDN environment utilizing extended OpenFlow
1.4.
Key generation: QKD involves the process of generating a unique code key that is shared by,
and known only to, the sender and recipient. Encryption of the message with a quantum key
protects its confidentiality by transforming it into an unintelligible form.
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A secure code for the QKD process can be generated in various ways. One such is via an One
Time Pad (OTP) device, while another way to generate such a code is via a Quantum random number
generator (QRNG). A QRNG is either a device which provide a stream of random bits generated
using methods based on the laws of quantum physics or a software implementation of an algorithm
which uses qubits in the backend to generate the random numbers making them truly random as
opposed to the pseudo random numbers generated today in RSA type implementations.
In order to generate true random numbers at a chip level hardware, photons are sent one at a
time into a semi‐transparent mirror and detected after which, the exclusive event of reflection or
transmission are given "0" or "1" values. This QRNG is intrinsically and provably random providing
instantaneous and inexhaustible entropy. ID Quantique (EP 2 940923 A1) uses similar elementary
quantum optics process to generate true random numbers leveraging photons and have widely
accepted industry adoption in addition to being discussed to be standardized at the ITU’s
Telecommunication Standardization Section (ITU‐T).
Currently various prior art options exist for key generation, via both software based and
hardware based solutions:
1) Software based options:
a) D‐Wave Systems’ digital ocean library with simulated annealing – a code exists today
which uses simulated annealing (i.e., code that runs on one’s computer) to achieve true
random quantum number generation.
b) Using IBM’s Qiskit or Google’s Cirq opensource Python libraries, a random number
generator can be designed using Hadamard gates and respecting Shannon’s Laws for
Quantum Cryptography.
c) An example of a random number generator using 4 bits of IBM Q Experience is shown in
Fig. 7a and corresponding pseudo‐code in Fig. 7b. Here “H” represents Hadamard gates,
“q” represents qubits, “c “ represents the control bits.
2) Hardware based options:
a. ID Quantique: Quantis is a quantum true random number generator developed by ID
Quantique. It can be used as a USB devices, PCI or PIC express card.
Once two Quantum Nodes (QN) establish their respective secure keys and authenticates on
the QKD network, they can engage in a “BB84 Protocol” over the Quantum Channel (Q‐Ch). Any pair
of QKD servers can perform a QKD protocol such as BB84. As of recent times, a key management
server architecture facilitated by QKarD’s (quantum smartcard which are fiber‐coupled devices)
prototyped by Los Alamos driven research has been demonstrated to perform BB84 over a distance
of 50 km using 1550 nm laser. The protocol is shown in Fig. 8.
The first stage of the BB84 protocol is the quantum transmission. For example, assume Alice
is on the transmitter and Bob on the receiver site of the quantum channel. Alice randomly chooses
two strings independent of each other with length m. The first string represents the basis for the
quantum transmission and the second the proper value of the specific bit. Alice and Bob have the
same mapping scheme in common.
Alice starts to transmit. Therefore, she takes the first bit of the first string, indicating which
base to use, and the first bit of the second string indicating which value to take. She applies this
procedure on all m‐bits of both strings and sends them as optical signal via the quantum channel to
Bob.
3
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Bob, on his part, also chooses a random string with length m, for his base choices. With
these bits he measures the incoming signal with the corresponding filter. Bob keeps the
measurement results to himself. A consideration of note is that Bob’s measurements do not
completely match with Alice’s measurements. This mismatch may be due to optical misalignment,
disturbance on the quantum channel, noise in Bob’s detectors, or the presence of an eavesdropper
Eve, although both choose the same basis.
The throughput of the quantum channel is given by:
.

.

.

.

consists now of the mean photon number , factor
where gain of the quantum channel
is
represents the fiber loss (which is distance dependent and increases with higher distances),
the receiver's detection efficiency and
is a factor accounting for the reduction of the photon
detection rate due to the dead time, which is the hold‐off time following each detection event;
during this time the bias voltage of the device is below a certain level such that no photon can be
is the additional loss of the system.
detected, and
After the communication between Alice and Bob on the quantum channel is finished, they
switch to the public channel. At this point, Alice holds the two strings of length m containing her
choice of base and value and Bob a string of length m containing his choice of bases and his
measurement results of length . .

4 SUMMARY
In one aspect an architecture for implementing QKD as an integrated service in SDN
environment is provided utilizing extended OpenFlow 1.4. Accordingly, QKMSs are constructed over
the software‐defined optical networks to satisfy these requirements utilizing OpenFlow 1.4. The
synchronized secret keys can be stored in the corresponding quantum key distribution server (QKDS)
which is embedded in each node. To enhance the secret‐key management, the secret keys between
each pair of quantum nodes (QN) can be virtualized into a QKMS. QKMS can dynamically provide
different number of secret keys for data encryption according to different security requirements
between the two nodes. This function relies on the QKMS to allocate secret keys for security
requirements in a timely manner on demand and is defined as Quantum Key on Demand (QKoD).
In another aspect, a system to manage QKD over SDN is provided.

5 DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS
The features of the invention will become more apparent in the following detailed description
in which reference is made to the appended drawings wherein:
Fig. 1 is an architecture diagram for the QKD Service Systems (QKDServ) based on novel OpenFlow
1.4 extensions;
Fig. 2a illustrates a QKDServ key distribution process between two Quantum Nodes (QNs);
Fig. 2b illustrates process of assignment of quantum secure keys in the SDN controlled QKD
environment;
Figs. 3a, 3b, 3c, 3d, 3e, and 3f depict various proposed extensions in OpenFlow 1.4 protocol headers
which leverages quantum metadata;
4
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Fig. 4 shows the intercommunication workflow among the three architectural planes of the QKDServ
for successful QKD service creation;
Fig. 5 is a flowchart for strategies for routing and Quantum Key Rate (QKR) assignment;
Fig. 6a shows Table 1 depicting the algorithm for QKD Routing, Key and Wavelength assignment
(QEKWa);
Fig. 6b shows Table 2 which illustrates the notation and definitions of terminology and parameters in
the QRKWa algorithm in Table 1;
Fig. 7a is an illustration of a prior art showing a circuit used to generate a quantum random number
represented by 4 qubits using IBM’s Qiskit and gate model;
Fig. 7b shows a quantum random number generation algorithm;
Fig. 8 shows interaction and communication workflow in a prior art depicting quantum BB84
protocol.
Like reference symbols and numbers in the drawings indicate like elements.

6 DETAILED DESCRIPTION
Embodiments will now be described with reference to the figures. For simplicity and clarity of
illustration, where considered appropriate, reference numerals may be repeated among the figures
to indicate corresponding or analogous elements. In addition, various specific details are set forth in
order to provide a thorough understanding of the embodiments described herein. It will be
understood by those of ordinary skill in the art that the embodiments described herein may be
practiced without these specific details. In other instances, well‐known methodologies, procedures
and components have not been described in detail so as not to obscure the embodiments described
herein.
Also, the description is not to be considered as limiting the scope of the embodiments
described herein. It will also be appreciated that any module, unit, component, server, computer,
terminal or device exemplified herein that executes instructions may include or otherwise have
access to computer readable media such as storage media, computer storage media, or data storage
devices (removable and/or non‐removable). Such as, for example, magnetic disks, optical disks, or
tape. Computer storage media may include volatile and non‐volatile, removable and non‐removable
media implemented in any method or technology for storage of information, such as computer
readable instructions, data structures, program modules, or other data. Examples of computer
storage media include RAM, ROM, EEPROM, flash memory or other memory technology, CD‐ROM,
digital versatile disks (DVD) or other optical storage, magnetic cassettes, magnetic tape, magnetic
disk storage or other magnetic storage devices, or any other medium which can be used to store the
desired information and which can be accessed by an application, module, or both. Any such
computer storage media may be part of the device or accessible or connectable thereto. Any
application or module herein described may be implemented using computer readable/executable
instructions that may be stored or otherwise held by such computer readable media.

1
Quantum cryptographic related capabilities have been recently highlighted as an important
functionality for military and federal governmental tactical networks, where assured networking is
critical and flexible management are needed – SDN related technology excels at this today. This
5
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versatile and programmable network architecture is expected to be more suitable to support future
heterogeneous systems and implement ad‐hoc network policies that may arise, for example, in
tactical environments. By standards of fast emerging technologies, this needs to include quantum
encryption and communication models to secure, encode and transmit information. Quantum Key
Distribution (QKD) is a process that uses a quantum channel (Q‐Ch) together with a public channel
(P‐Ch) to securely exchange secret keys between two legitimate parties.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is a process that uses a quantum channel (Q‐Ch) together
with a public channel (P‐Ch) to securely exchange secret keys between two legitimate parties. A Q‐
Ch is capable of carrying the quantum bits (qubits) which is generated by encoding classical bits into
quantum states of light, while a P‐Ch is capable of carrying classical data to compare the
measurements associated with these qubits as well as perform post‐processing correct distillation of
the secret keys.
Fig 1. Depicts the QKDServ Systems Architecture (QKD Service Systems) based on novel
OpenFlow 1.4 extensions which will be addressed in this document later.
In order to deploy QKDServ for multiple users, an SDN architecture for QKD network control
and management is introduced in Fig. 1. This QKDServ architecture framework consists of three
planes in a top‐down design: Application (100), Control (110) and Infrastructure (130).
Protocols such as OpenFlow 1.4.0 and NETCONF are applied to the southbound interface
(109) between infrastructure plane (130) and control plane (110). This is used to transmit control
and configuration (406) messages such as control and configure secret‐key exchange, storage, relay,
assignment, destruction etc.
OpenFlow 1.4.0 (OFP) has been chosen in this architecture as the southbound interface
protocol given by 109. Feasibility of using OFP in an SDN‐enabled QKD network has been
experimentally verified.
In this architectural framework, OpenFlow plugin is extended to implement the southbound
interface (109) via a service abstraction layer (105). The northbound interface (103) between
control and application planes is implemented with RESTful API and is used to transmit QKD service
request/transmit messages.
The request/response messages of QKD service creation (104), modification (106) and
deletion (108) are implemented using the POST, PUT and DELETE methods of Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP), respectively.
The timely key synchronisation and Service configuration is achieved by a match/action pair
flow rule in OpenFlow. This rule modifies and identifies the incoming packets in accordance with the
device’s flow table.
The same match/action pair flow is used for encrypting specific incoming packets to identify
(i.e. match) traffic and apply encryption to it (i.e. action). As OpenFlow support traffic matching
down the layer stack, there is no necessity to modify or extend the matching process.
The three planes for this QKDServ architecture are implemented as follows:
1) Application plane (100): This design considers only one QKD network management (102)
operator or service provider (QKDServ provider) over the QKD network infrastructure.

6
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The QKDServ provider at the Application plane (100) receives the QKR (Quantum Key Rate)
requirements (given by 205 and 207 in Fig. 2a) of each user (101), generates and sends
multiple QKD services requests (104) to the control plane (110).
Each QKDServ request includes a specific QKR requirement between two QN’s (QKD Nodes)
given by 134. A QKR request can need one or more QKR slots (Fig 2a).
The secret‐key size can be managed since only one encryption algorithm (One Time Pad or
Quantum Random Number Generator) is used for the QKDServ architecture framework.
2) Control Plane (110): The SDN controller (111) is deployed in the control plane (110). This
controls and manages the QNs (134) in the infrastructure plane via OFP and OpenFlow
agents.
In Fig. 1, the SDN controller interfaces with a database and Network Services (114). The QKR
information about the QKD service requests are held in the database.
The SDN controller can be any device which supports OpenFlow.
The controller platform (111) will develop QKDServ functions (112) supporting at least six
different modules as follows:
 Topology (113): used to collect, store and update the QKD network topology and the
QN (134) information.
 Resource (119): used to store and update point‐to‐point QKR information on each
QKDL (132).
 Services (117): used for QKD service creation, modification, deletion, storing and
updating of the QKD service information.
 Routing (118): used to compute and select the QKD path between QN pairs (134).
 Strategy (116): used to perform QKR selection and assignment to satisfy the QKR
requirements of QKD service requests.
 QKMS (115): Management services for the Quantum Key generation, retention and
distribution of QKR (202, 205, 207)
Several QKMSs (115) can be constructed on the control plane (110) to manage the secret
keys between QKD node ( QN, given by 100) pairs, where the QKMSs are all controlled by
the SDN controller and can manage secret‐key exchange, storage, assignment, and
destruction in a pair‐wise manner.
The SDN controller (111) with programmable and flexible network control capabilities can
also provide the effective implementation technique for QKMSs. In general, an SDN
controller is a centralized controller at a logical level, while QKD devices are distributed
across the network and co‐located with network nodes.
The southbound (109) and northbound (103) interfaces cannot know the real secret keys,
the security of the secret keys is assured.
3) Infrastructure Plane (130): The QNs (134) are interconnected by the QKDLs (132) in the
infrastructure plane. OpenFlow agents are placed at each QN (134) to support an extended
OFP and use a short‐reach interface to communicate with the QN. The short‐reach interface
is inside the secure perimeter which enables the short‐reach to communicate with the
node’s (i.e., the QN’s) security perimeter. The short‐reach interface is used to connect two
devices at the same physical location. This location is securely contained and protected
7
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within a security infrastructure. For example, a short‐reach interface can be implemented
using a cable for Internet Protocol (IP) connection between two co‐located devices whose
security is assured by protecting them within the physically secure security perimeter or
location.
The communication between the SDN controller (111) and a QN (134) is achieved via
protocol interpretation and messages in‐between OpenFlow agents. This same
communication between OpenFlow agents enables QNs to follow instructions from the SDN
controller. Secret keys are constantly produced as per the secure QKD Rate (QKR) between
two directly connected QNs.
The attainable QKR (202 in Fig. 2a) on each QKDL (132) is decided during the QKD network
deployment.
A QN (134) and its respective OpenFlow agent together form the OpenFlow enabled QN,
which is named QN‐OF (134). Since all QNs referred to in this document are OpenFlow
enabled, terms “QN” and “QN‐OF” will be sued interchangeably in this work.
In contrast to prior art techniques, this architecture decouples QKD layer from the optical
layer by constructing QKMSs (115) in the QKD layer. Two types of QKMSs, ones between the SDN
controller (111) and each QN (134) and the ones between two nodes (QKD servers or QKDS given by
204 in Fig. 2a), are constructed to ensure the security of control messages via the control channels
and services via the data channels, respectively. The QKD layer and the optical layer are controlled
via southbound interface protocol (e.g., OpenFlow and NETCONF) given by 109, by the SDN
controller (111) in control layer (110), where OpenFlow 1.4 protocol is used as southbound interface
protocol (109).
The SDN controller with a programmable and flexible centralized network control manner
can be used as the effective implementation technique for the control layer, which has been verified
in recent research on SDN‐controlled optical networks with time‐shared QKD resources.
The QKD layer and optical layer share the optical fiber resources from physical WDM optical
networks, where two wavelengths should be reserved as quantum channel (Q‐Ch) and public
channel (P‐Ch) for constructing the OpenFlow‐enabled QKMSs to jointly ensure the security of C‐Chs
and D‐Chs. The remaining wavelengths can be used to support confidential service transmission.
OpenFlow‐enabled optical cross connects (OXCs) are deployed in the optical layer in the
Infrastructure plane (130).
The SDN controller is responsible for the management of entire network whereas the QKMS
and OXCs are responsible for operating based on the instructions from the SDN controller. Service
requests with different security requirements are triggered from the Application layer and interacts
with the control layer via the RESTful API which is used as the northbound interface protocol.
Control channels and data channels may require different number of secret keys according
to their security requirements. Specifically, this architecture can control and manage the network‐
wide secret‐key resources in QKMSs to enable QKoD functionality in the QKDServ framework.
Note that the secret keys will not be delivered via the southbound and northbound
interfaces. The secret keys are delivered from the secret‐key servers of QKD nodes (QN) to the data
communication equipment directly to satisfy the secret‐key demands. The SDN controller and
QKMSs on the control plane, as well as the QKD service users on the application plane are capable of
obtaining the real‐time secret‐key rate and volume information, but they cannot know the real
secret keys. The real secret keys are still stored in the secret‐key servers (QKDS), given by 204, of
8
Published by Technical Disclosure Commons, 2020

10

Defensive Publications Series, Art. 2885 [2020]

QKD nodes (QN), given by 134, which can be delivered to the QKD service creation process directly
under the control of SDN controller (111). Thus, the security of secret keys is guaranteed in this
architecture.

2
Fig 2a illustrates a QKDServ (Quantum Key Distribution Services) communication between
Node‐A and Node‐B. The core principle of QKDServ is that an on‐demand service can be offered to
users over QKD network infrastructure (Fig. 1) where multiple users can apply for various QKD
services to obtain their Quantum Key Services instead of having to deploy their own specific point‐
to‐point QKD services for each and every connection. The extension of QKD technology from point‐
to‐point to network‐wide infrastructure necessitates enhancements in secret‐key synchronization
and options in storage and provisioning – this in turn should improve the performance of security
and resource management.
In fig. 2a user A (101) requests a QKD service and associated QKR assignment (205). In order
to achieve this, the QKD path is computed and selected by the algorithm in Fig 5.
In the next step, the required QKR of the QKD service is queried for each user, for example,
in Fig. 2a, 3 kbps (205) and 4 kbps QKR (207) requests are generated for User A and User B
respectively.
In case there are other QKD service requests, the available QKR (202) on the specific QKDL
(132) is queried along the QKD path. The available QKR (202) is a real‐time value based on the QKDL
condition obtained by the QKD nodes reporting to the SDN controller (111) in real time.
If the available QKR can satisfy the QKR requirement of a QKD service request then the
selection of the required QKR is performed from the corresponding QKDL for this service request;
otherwise the specific QKD service request is rejected as per the algorithm shown in Fig. 5.
After the QKR generation is successfully accomplished, the QKD nodes use the produced
secret keys on QKDL to generate the session keys to encrypt the session. The host of each site
retrieves a session key from the locally hosted QKDS in the local QKD node (QN). Hosts obtain secure
session keys and engage in encrypted individual communication sessions over classical (or
conventional) network connection such as optical fiber, copper, wireless broadband etc.
Quantum secret key servers (QKDS) given by (204) are used to store the secret keys
produced and relay it for end‐to‐end QKD service (Fig. 1).
The QKDServ example in Fig. 2a maintains a key repository, referred to as QKMS (Quantum
Key Management Server) given by (115). The QKMS securely holds the key material generated via
QKD.
The receiving device (User B, for example) or receiver (206) receives the encrypted
information and uses the produced secret keys on QKDL to decrypt it. It can also share the produced
secret keys with User A over the same QKDL. It is to be noted that the produced secret keys based
on the individual QKR’s should have the same secret‐key size if one‐time pad algorithm is used for
ITS (Information Theoretic Security) encryption of secret keys. The transmitting device is given by
208.
Finally produced keys are assigned to User A or User B.
9
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The generated secret keys between QKD Node‐A and QKD Node‐B can be stored in QKDS‐A
(204) and QKDS‐B (204), which are embedded in Node‐A and Node‐B, respectively.
In Fig 2a, the generated secret keys are managed by QKMS to monitor the real‐time
remaining number of secret keys and provision secret keys between Node‐A and Node‐B.
Secret Key Allocation: In a QKD network, secret keys are constantly and uniquely produced
without a re‐use option. In this case, the concept of Quantum Key Rate (QKR) introduced here, is
important since it is approximately 2 Mb/sec over 50 km standard optical fiber link as per technology
available at the time of authoring this. The QKR (202, 205, 207) involves the generation of secret
quantum keys in bits per second and is independent of any other network infrastructure resource.
The secret keys are stored in the corresponding secure QKDS’s which are part of each QN (134).
Management of the secret keys can be enhanced if a QKMS is virtualised between the
participating Quantum Key nodes. The virtualised QKMS will then dynamically provide different
number of secret keys for data encryption as per various corresponding security requirements.
The generation of secret quantum session keys via the QKMS (115) can be summarised as
follows:
1. Quantum Node (QN) A (134) encodes raw keys in quantum signals and transmits them to
Quantum Node B (134) via Q‐Ch (quantum channel).
2. Quantum Nodes A and B exchange public information to accomplish secret‐key
synchronisation via the P‐Ch (public channel).
3. The synchronised secret keys between Nodes A and B are stored in QKDS‐A (204) and QKDS‐
B (204) respectively which are embedded in the respective nodes.
4. The secret keys between QKDS‐A and QKDS‐B are virtualised to construct QKMS which
enables the distribution of QKD keys on demand according to different security demands
between Nodes A and B through the control channel or data channel.
The QKMS construction process is summarized in three main steps:
(1) Quantum communication node (QN)‐A encodes raw keys in quantum signals and
transmits them to QN‐B via the quantum channel (Q‐Ch). QN is an aggregating device
that contains quantum transceiver/receiver combination.
(2) QN‐A and QN‐B interchange public information to accomplish secret‐key
synchronization via the public channel (P‐Ch).
(3) The synchronized secret keys between QN‐A and QN‐B are stored in QKDS‐A and QKDS‐
B which are embedded in Node‐A and Node‐B, respectively. The secret keys between
QKDS‐A and QKDS‐B are virtualized to construct the QKDL (132), which enables QKoD
according to different security requirements between Node‐A and Node‐B through the
control channel (C‐Ch) or data channel (D‐Ch).
Besides QKD enhancements, also important are wavelength allocation for QKMSs and
optically supported software‐defined networks are important for QKMS construction: Two
wavelength channels should be reserved as Q‐Ch and P‐Ch for secret‐key synchronization in WDM
support in the optical underlay for the SDN. The control messages are transmitted by IP‐based
routing through the control channels in software‐defined networks (SDN), and hence, control
channels will occupy IP channels rather than data channels. Q‐Ch, P‐Ch and D‐Ch can be placed at C‐
band (1530−1565 nm) to achieve lower attenuation performance and high compatibility with the
existing WDM optical networks.
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Additionally, physical layer impairments must be considered while allocating wavelengths
for Q‐Ch and P‐Ch. Raman scattering can be reduced by placing the Q‐Ch at the highest frequency.
Moreover, four‐wave‐mixing (FWM) effect can be minimized by reserving 200 GHz spaced
bandwidth between Q‐Ch and classical channels (i.e., P‐Ch and D‐Ch).
Prior art techniques for QKD networks mainly focussed on deployment of point‐to‐point
links, where a pair of QNs is required for each connection. Recently, time‐scheduled technique has
been proposed to reduce the financial expenditure of deploying a QKD network . Hence, based on
the specific requirement of QKMS construction over a software‐defined optical network, a single QN
(134) can be enabled to be time‐shared between multiple endpoints allowing the establishment of
multiple QKD connections using fewer QNs. This technique reduces the cost of QKMS (115)
construction over an SDN network because of the significant reduction in hardware and the efficient
usage of QNs.
Secret‐key resources in QKMSs are finite and precious. Hence, the secret‐key assignment
problem for the C‐Chs and D‐Chs should be addressed while implementing QKoD as a function of
QKDServ. In SDN, the control messages via the control channels are usually transferred at megabit‐
per‐second data rate, which are lower than the data complexity of attacks. Hence, to enhance the
security performance of C‐Chs, key‐assignment and key‐updating are performed for control
messages between the SDN controller and each node through the QKDL of a service. Each node
along the QKDL is configured by the SDN controller, and then, the control messages are sent to each
node via the control channels. Based on the specific security requirement of control channels, QKMS
for C‐Chs can allocate the required number of secret keys for SDN controller and nodes to secure the
control messages via the control channels.
Different number of secret keys (denoted as Keyx‐y, where x is the node number and y is the
service number) can be assigned for control channels between the SDN controller and different
nodes along different QKD links (QKDL).
In an embodiment in Fig. 2b, Key1‐1 (and Key2‐1) are assigned for control channels between
the SDN controller and Node 1 (and Node 2) through the lightpath Node 1→2 of Service 1; Key1‐2
(and Key2‐2, Key3‐2) are assigned for control channels between the SDN controller and Node 1 (and
Node 2, Node 3) through the QKDL Node 1→3 of Service 2.
For the services via the data channels, the required number of secret keys is related to the
key‐length and key‐updating period. Based on the specific security requirement of data channels,
QKMSs for D‐Chs can allocate the required number of secret keys for the source and destination
nodes to secure the services via the data channels. For example, for three services (denoted as ,
, and ) with different security requirements (including keylength and key‐updating period) the
time complexity of attacks for key updating (i.e., the maximum available time for a secret key,
denoted as ) and data complexity of attacks for key updating (i.e., the maximum data size that can
be encrypted by a secret key, denoted as ) give the required key lengths of , , and as 128
bit, 192 bit and 256 bit, respectively for the required key‐updating periods of , , and are ,
, and
(
) respectively. Hence, the
respectively , or , , and
service with longer key‐length and shorter key‐updating period shows higher security level and
requires more secret keys to be assigned for data encryption.
Both in cases of Fig. 2a and 2b, once the QKD authentication process is complete, the users
communicate using a BB84 type (Fig. 8 prior art) Quantum Communication protocol.
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3
Protocol Extension of OpenFlow 1.4 (Figs. 3a‐f): This architecture leverages quantum
metadata communication (301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306) in the SDN managed by utilizing its
compatibility with the OpenFlow 1.4 protocol. Controllers today leverage OpenFlow functionalities.
Because of its flexibility in programmability and compatibility with management of optical networks,
OpenFlow is highly suitable to control the new attributes defining the classical channel that carries
metadata between various quantum aware stacks/devices. In particular, OpenFlow version 1.4
extensively supports attributes specific to lambda‐switching in optical networks that allows the
ability to manage quantum optical channels interconnecting quantum network devices.
Fig 3a‐3f show the OpenFlow 1.4 extension needed to enable QKD service creation (104),
modification (106) and deletion (108), since OFP, in its original format, can only support packet‐
switching in the electrical domain. New messages are attached to the OFP 1.4.0 header for the ease
of implementation in an OpenFlow based platform via the use of YANG tools.
Fig 3(a)‐3(f) shows the main structure of extended OFP messages for QKD service creation
request (405 in Fig. 4) and response, QKD service modification request and response, and QKD
service deletion request and response.
The OFP v1.4.0 header is composed of version, type, length, and xid. The version field
indicates the OFP version being used. The type field indicates the type of the message. In this
architecture, the message types of QKD service creation, modification and deletion requests and
responses are configured as 32 (301, 302, 303) and 33 (304, 305, 306), respectively. The length field
indicates the total length of the message. The xid which depicts the transaction ID, is a unique value
used to match requests to responses.
In addition to the OFP v1.4.0 header, 32 bits were added for QKD service ID (311) to
represent a QKD service and 32 bits for QN‐OF ID (321). Additionally, another 32 bits were added for
message function to exhibit the different functions of extended OFP messages. For example,
0x0000FFFF (331), 0xFFFFFFFF (341), and 0xFFFF0000 (351) to indicate the message functions of QKD
service creation, modification, and deletion requests and responses, respectively. Another 32 bits
were for both the input port (371) and output port (381) of each QNs (134) along the QKD path of
this QKD service.
A set of 128 bits were added for QKR slot ID (361) to describe the usage of 128 QKR slots
(e.g., 1 is busy and 0 is free). Based on the number of attainable QKR slots on each QKDL, the
number of bits for QKR slot ID can be changed. As shown in Figs. 3(a) and 3(c), the QKR slot usage
after QKD service creation and modification can be different, since a user can request to modify its
QKR requirement. Also, as illustrated in Figs. 3(b), 3(d), and 3(f), another 32 bits were added for QKD
service responses to indicate the status of QKD service creation (104), modification (106) and
deletion (108) process.

12
Published by Technical Disclosure Commons, 2020

14

Defensive Publications Series, Art. 2885 [2020]

4
Communication Workflow: Fig. 4 shows the communication workflow among the three
architectural planes of the QKDServ where the intercommunication for successful QKD service
creation is depicted.
As a first step, a service request (405) comes in from user(s) (101) in the application layer
(100) and the SDN controller (111) in the control plane configures all the QN‐OFs on the
infrastructure plane to accomplish QKD network initialization.
After establishment of TCP session, the SDN controller achieves OpenFlow handshake and
exchanges keepalives with all the QN‐OFs (134). The SDN controller initializes all the QN‐OFs and
acquires detailed information of each QN‐OF. Based on the instructions from QKD network operator
on the application plane, the SDN controller configures (406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411) point‐to‐point
QKD connections via connection of QN‐OFs (134) to the corresponding QN‐OFs using QKDLs (132) to
constitute the QKD network.
After the QKD network is up and running, the QKD network topology and QKR on each QKDL
is automatically reported to the SDN controller (412). After QKD network initialization, QKD network
operator generates multiple QKD service requests according to the QKR requirements of different
users, and sends these requests to the SDN controller. The QKDServ involves the creation (104),
modification (106), and deletion (108) of QKD services.
Upon receiving a QKD service creation request (405), the SDN controller computes and
selects the QKD path between the source QN‐OF and destination QN‐OF. Then, SDN controller
searches the real‐time available QKR slots on each QKDL along the selected QKD path and selects the
required QKR slots.
If the real‐time available QKR slots are capable of satisfying the QKR requirement of this
request, the SDN controller configures the source OF‐QUN, intermediate QN‐OF(s), and destination
QN‐OF along the QKD path to accomplish SKR slot assignment for QKD service creation. Otherwise
this QKD service creation request will be rejected.
The intermediate QN‐OF(s) along the selected QKD path can relay the secret keys for long‐
distance end‐to‐end QKD. After accomplishing QKR slot assignment for QKD service creation, a
success response will be sent back to the QKD network operator.
In addition, when the QKR requirement of a user changes, the established QKD service for
this user needs to modify its QKR requirement.
Upon receiving a QKD service modification request, SDN controller first performs the steps 3
and 4 numbered in Fig. 4. If the real‐time available QKR slots along the QKD path can satisfy the
modified QKR requirement, QKR slot re‐assignment (i.e., steps 5 to 10 numbered in Fig. 4) will be
performed for QKD service modification. Otherwise the QKD service modification request will be
rejected.
In addition, optionally, QKD network management (102) operator can request the deletion
of a QKD service when the QKD service has expired (i.e., at the end time of QKD service request).
Upon receiving a QKD service deletion request, SDN controller configures the QN‐OF(s) to stop
assigning QKR slots to this QKD service and deletes the information of this QKD service.
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5
Routing and QKR Assignment Strategy for QKD Service Creation: Fig 5 presents the routing
and QKR assignment strategy for QKD service creation and modification. The overall objective of this
strategy is to accommodate the QKD service requests successfully for multiple users as many as
possible over a QKD network.
The QKD network model and QKD service request model is as follows:
The QKD network topology is denoted by G(VQ, VT, K), where VQ, VT and K denote the sets of
QN‐OFs, QKDLs, and attainable QKR slots on each QKDL, respectively.
Assumption is that the number of attainable QKR slots on each QKDL is the same, which is
fixed to |K|. The set of incoming QKD service requests is denoted by R.
, , , , , ,
where , , , and
A QKD service request is modelled (501) as
denote the source QN‐OF, destination QN‐OF, start time, and end time of QKD service request ,
respectively.
The required number of QKR slots for QKD service (corresponding to ) creation is denoted
by . The number of times for the modification of QKD service (corresponding to ) within the
holding time is denoted by .
The changed number of QKR slots for modifying QKD service (corresponding to ) each time
. Note that the value of
can be positive or negative, since the required number
is denoted by
of QKR slots for modifying QKD service each time can be increased or decreased.
At first, Dijkstra algorithm is utilized (502) to compute and select the shortest QKD path
between the source QN‐OF and destination QN‐OF of QKD service request, since the shortest QKD
path is beneficial to reduce the required number of QKDLs and QKR slots for QKD service creation.
The worse‐case complexity of routing is O(|VQ ∪ VT |2).
Then, the real‐time available QKR slots on each QKDL along the selected QKD path are
computed, which can be obtained by the QN‐OF reporting to the SDN controller in real time (503).
If the QKR requirement of this QKD service creation can be satisfied (504), the first fit (FF)
algorithm is utilized (505) to select and assign the required SKR slots for QKD service creation,
otherwise this QKD service request is rejected (506).
The resource module in the SDN controller is used to store and update point‐to‐point QKR
information (including the attainable and real‐time available QKRs) on each QKDL (507, 513).
The FF algorithm is chosen in this case due to its low complexity and small computation
overhead. Using FF algorithm, all the real‐time available QKR slots are numbered (508), in which a
QKR slot with small serial number is selected and assigned before a QKR slot with large serial
number (509).
In this case, all the QKD service requests are treated with equal weights and process the QKD
service requests one by one with time. This is reasonable since we assume that QKD service requests
arrive dynamically queuing delay is not an option for any of those requests. Also, if a concurrency
situation occurs, the QKD service requests will be prioritised randomly and processed accordingly.
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QKR reassignment (510) is performed for QKD service modification (514).
If the QKR requirement of this QKD service modification is satisfied within the holding time,
FF algorithm is performed again (515) to select and assign the required SKR slots for QKD service
modification (106), otherwise this QKD service request is rejected (512).
The last step (515) ends the QKD service request process.
Routing and Key Assignment: Efficient implementation of QKD on Demand (QKoD) in the
QKDServ architecture utilizing SDN requires a novel routing and key assignment/distribution
strategy.
In this work, a QKD Routing, Key and Wavelength Assignment (QRKWa) algorithm is
proposed. QKMS‐D‐Ch for D‐Ch’s are built as needed between any pair of nodes and QKMS‐C‐Ch’s
for C‐Ch’s are built between any node and the SDN controller; hence, the number of QKMS‐D‐Ch and
QKMS‐C‐Ch are
1 /2 and respectively.
Different services over the data channels will need different key lengths and key‐updating
time periods. Hence, Eq. (1) and (2) below gives the security requirement matrices based on key‐
updating period dependent on the time complexity and data complexity of attacks respectively.
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Key‐assignment and key‐updating are performed for control messages between the SDN
controller and each node through the path of the service. Hence, the total number of secret keys
required to ensure the security of control messages via the control channels for service request is
given by Eq. (3) below
1

3

The number of secret keys for key‐updating, taking into account time and data complexities
of attacks, are given by Eq. (4) and (5) as follows:
4
5
Table 1 in Fig. 6a shows the proposed QRKWa algorithm. Table 2 in Fig 6b lists the definitions
for the symbols in Table 1.
Table 1 depicts a secure key on demand and an algorithm to govern routing, wavelength
allocation and the key assignment model. The notations and definitions of corresponding
terminology and parameters are shown in Table 2.
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The QRKWa algorithm is divided into three steps, i.e., QKD routing and wavelength
assignment (QRWa) for services via the data channels, key assignment (Ka) for control messages via
the control channels and key assignment for services via the data channels.
Note that the control channels occupy IP channels, and hence, QRWa step is not needed for
control channels. Two cases, specifically, time complexity of attacks and data complexity of attacks
are considered for key‐updating in key assignment for data channels.
In step 1, routing computation is done with K‐shortest‐path Dijkstra’s algorithm, and the
wavelengths reserved as data channels are allocated to the service with First Fit (FF) algorithm. The
service can establish a QKDL path with the assigned wavelength channel. The security requirement
of a service is represented by the required key‐length and key‐updating period as defined in Eqs. (1)–
(2), and the total required number of secret keys for the control channels and data channel of each
service is calculated by Eqs. (3)–(5).
In order to satisfy the security requirement, key assignment for control channels and data
channel of each service is performed in step 2 and step 3, respectively. In step 2 and step 3, secret
keys stored in QKMSs are allocated for the corresponding control channels and data channels by
utilizing FF algorithm, respectively.
Note that the secret keys in the QKMSs (115) are stored in the unit of bit and cannot be
reutilized, and hence, the FF algorithm with simple implementation advantage can provide relatively
good performance in key assignment.
Lines 2 to 38 accomplish the QRWa for control channels and data channel of service request r.
Considering the worst condition, the time complexity of step 1 (lines 2 to 14), step 2 (lines 15 to 22)
and step 3 (lines 23 to 38) are K|V|2 + K|W|, |Qc| and 1, respectively. Hence, the total time
complexity of QRKWa algorithm for service request is approximately O(K|V|2).
1. The entry point for manufacturers is the fact that they will only need to produce the
device/solution without the need for the whole network and all its associated device to be
“quantum aware”. The controller will manage the specific requirements, interactions and
configure their capabilities.
2. The specific data that the QKD environment will produce, i.e., the keys, can be managed by
the controller itself. This means that if it is a “forwarding key” or a control plane security key
then the controller can manage its associations and hand it over when and as appropriate to
another entity such as the QKMS via API transparently.
3. Telecommunications industry perspective is the controller will run inside a trusted domain
which is a secure environment from a physical and logical point of view – hence using
trusted repeaters does not involve an extra security assumption. Different QoS can still be
distinguished and managed accordingly.
4. For a start, this solution can be implemented in a small‐scale quantum network and then
expanded in an incremental manner.
5. The quantum part of the larger network can be upgraded as and when technologies become
available. A hybrid of classical and quantum switching network has been tested. This can be
used for starter solution and expanded as and when new technology becomes available.
6. A hybrid usage of quantum and classical crypto can be easily implemented, with AES 256
type of algorithm for the classical part.
7. From the perspective of a network operator, the integration of SDN type environment could
reduce CPEX because the deployment of a QKD pair for each point‐to‐point will not be
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necessary provided a transmitter can be time‐shared among various receivers – hence
number of QKD devices could be reduced.
8. And lastly, the network itself can be a user of the QKD keys.
Whereas QKD can provide end‐to‐end encryption based security which is immensely improved
from what we have today, Q‐Ch’s and P‐Ch’s should be protected simultaneously in a QKD over SDN
environment. Due to the key updating period at different time slots for different services, security
level protection will occur at sub‐wavelength level.
Budget Estimate demands that two types of nodes should be deployed in a QKD environment:
QKD node and intermediate node with trusted repeaters following ITS convention. In practice
variation in number of nodes and types of channels will require different budget estimates and
associated efficiency of the QKD implementation.
Consideration of Key Generation is needed in regards the following: The generation rate of
secret keys in bits per second in current QKD systems is low compared with the gigabit per second
data transmission. Whereas this is not a bottleneck for networks within 50 km of distance, this will
add to power consumption if and when the intermediate nodes are implemented in order to
increase distance efficiency as increasing the number of nodes and Q‐Ch’s/P‐Ch’s/C‐Ch’s will further
increase the required key rate.
In regards to tools, Google released Cirq as opensource in July 2018. It is envisaged that either
Cirq or TensorFlow or both can be leveraged on GPU driven hardware (NVIDIA for example) and/or
on HyperFlex AI starter kit for the coding side while either Google’s D‐Wave based computing
infrastructure can cover the quantum chipset requirement. Another option is IBM Q‐Experience lab
(who has made their superconductor based 16 qubit computing available for all research) can be
leveraged for the actual backend quantum computing. Both IBM and Google have publicly expressed
their strong intention to move forward towards Universal Quantum Computing, the next goal being
50 qubit computation capability. A third option is Artiste and a still fourth option is Rigetti who has
created a Python library called “Pyquil”.
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